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Abstract: In 1922, British colonial Gambia demonetized the French five-franc coin, 
which had been legal tender at a fixed rate in the colony since 1843. Until World War 
I, this rate was close to the international rate under the gold standard. When the franc 
began to depreciate in 1918, however, a gap emerged between the Gambian rate and 
the international rate, prompting a rapid influx of the coins.  The demonetization cost 
the colonial administration over a year’s revenue, affecting the later development of 
the colony. The 1920s have long been a fruitful period of the study of monetary histo-
ry owing to the instability of exchange rates during and after the war. This paper ex-
tends the study of this period to examine the impact of these changes on dependent 
colonies in West Africa, highlighting the importance of local compromises and par-
ticularities in colonial monetary systems.  
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I 
‘Is there any point to which you would wish to draw my attention?’  
‘To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time’ 
‘The dog did nothing in the night-time.’ 
‘That was the curious incident’, remarked Sherlock Holmes.  
-Arthur Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze (1892) 
 
In January 1922, the colonial administration of the Gambia demonetized French five-
franc coins throughout the territory. The coins had been legal tender in the Gambia at 
the rate of 3s 10½d since 1843. Outside government transactions, the usual local rate 
was four shillings. The coins had continued to circulate at that rate within the Gambia, 
despite the depreciation of the franc on international markets since World War I. The 
colonial government in Bathurst resisted calls by banks, traders and the Colonial Of-
fice to demonetize the coin, even as costs mounted. In the end, the cost of the demon-
etization was more than a year’s revenue for the small territory. The delay under-
mined the financial stability that the colonial administration had built over the preced-
ing decades and affected its development thereafter.  
 The demonetization of the franc features in most histories of the Gambia as 
‘an interesting incident in the financial history’ of the territory (Southorn 1952, p. 
204). Gray (1940, p. 487) fixes it in the context of World War I, writing that ‘like 
other countries the Gambia has been affected by many of the aftermaths of the war. 
One of these, which was more or less peculiar to the Gambia, but which none the less 
affected the country very seriously, was due to the depreciation of the franc’. Others 
emphasize the considerable financial cost of the demonetization (Gailey 1964, pp. 
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167-9; Hughes and Perfect 2006, p. 36). The most recent treatment of the Gambia’s 
economic history explains the delay in demonetizing the franc as the outcome of de-
bates between different interest groups, including the British government, the colonial 
administration and members of the local commercial sector (Swindell and Jeng 2001, 
pp. 191-2). 
 Outside histories of the Gambia, there are references to the use of the five-
franc coin in the territory, but the 1922 crisis has been largely forgotten. Hopkins’ 
Economic History of West Africa discusses the region’s changing monetary systems 
over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and notes that ‘francs were widely used in 
the groundnut trade as early as the 1850s’ but does not mention the later crisis.1 The 
demonetization, however, raises wider questions about the development of colonial 
currency systems in West Africa. First, why did the Gambia retain as legal tender a 
foreign coin even after efforts to standardize the colonial monetary systems of British 
and French Africa? Second, why did the Gambian administration delay demonetizing 
the five-franc coin? More broadly, how did changes in the international monetary sys-
tem influence African economies?  
This paper provides a new account of the crisis, placing it within the context 
of the changing international monetary regimes and the evolution of colonial financial 
policies during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Increasing trade with Europe 
and the expansion of colonial rule accompanied major changes in West African cur-
rency systems. One such change was an influx of European and American coins. Of 
these, the five-franc coin, became the most important currency of the growing 
groundnut trade of the Senegambian region, which included the Gambia river and its 
surrounding hinterlands. The coin, made of silver, was first produced under the bime-
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tallic regime in use in France and other European countries through most of the nine-
teenth century. When France adopted the gold standard in the 1870s, the coin – 
though still made of silver - became a token backed by French gold reserves but re-
tained its nominal value and rate of exchange of four shillings. Its silver content also 
gave it an intrinsic value that varied with the price of silver bullion. Restrictions were 
placed on its production in the 1870s after imports of the coin into Latin Union coun-
tries increased and it ceased to be minted in 1878 (Gallarotti 1993, p. 16). However, 
demand for the coins continued in West Africa and an increasing number accumulat-
ed in the region. 
At the same time, the Scramble for Africa left the British government with a 
narrow slice of territory along the Gambia River. The river, a valuable asset because it 
was navigable far into the interior, had long been the meeting point for trading net-
works stretching from the Atlantic Coast and forest zones to the Sahara (Barry 1998).  
The region’s role as an entrepôt continued under British rule. To support the cost of 
administering Britain’s smallest West African territory, the colonial treasury relied on 
revenue linked to the movement of people and goods across the long and largely un-
enforced border. This dependence prompted colonial officials to lobby for the contin-
ued circulation of French currency within the Gambia, even following efforts to en-
sure convertibility in the currency of British West Africa as a whole, as colonial offi-
cials believed that demonetizing the five-franc coin would disrupt the trade. Relative-
ly stable rates of exchange between the pound and the franc under the gold standard 
allowed this equilibrium to persist, highlighting important links between the gold 
standard, expanding trade and colonialism during the pre-war period.  
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With the collapse of the gold standard during World War I, however, mone-
tary arrangements in the Gambia had to be reconsidered. The origins of the crisis, and 
the colonial administration’s hesitation in addressing it, sheds light on the challenges 
of building a colonial currency system which balanced local interests against efforts 
to reduce transaction costs in imperial trade. Previous proposals to demonetize the 
franc were abandoned on the grounds that the local circumstances of the Gambia 
made such a policy impractical.  
 
Map 1 The Gambia in West Africa 
Source: Author using Magic Maps template.  
 
 
 
The next section will provide a brief history of what this paper is calling the 
curious incident of the franc in the Gambia. The third section will explore the origins 
of the crisis in the development of a colonial political economy dependent on smug-
gling and migration from Senegal. The fourth section explores reasons why the Gam-
bian administration fought to keep the pre-war exchange rate and offers some tenta-
tive implications of the incident for the history of imperial monetary systems. Section 
5 concludes. 
 
II 
The foundations of the Gambia’s currency crisis were laid in 1843, when the local 
sterling value of the five-franc coin was fixed at 3s 10½d by the order-in-council es-
tablishing the colony’s administration.2 This point marked the beginning of a crucial 
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period of change in both the political and monetary landscape of the region. Exten-
sions of European political authority into the interior continued through the rest of the 
century, ultimately creating the boundaries of colonial Africa. At the same time, cur-
rency systems in the regions were changing rapidly. An older system of assortment 
bargaining in which baskets of goods were valued according to imaginary units of 
account such as iron bars had begun to decline in the eighteenth century (Curtin 1975, 
pp. 247-64).  After that, Webb (1999) describes the region as divided into overlapping 
currency zones, each of which was dominated by a particular currency or set of cur-
rencies. These included both indigenous products such as salt or millet as well as im-
ported goods like cowrie shells and brass manilas on the lower Guinea coast and Indi-
an ‘guinee’ cloth along the Senegal River trade routes. These were joined from the 
eighteenth century by silver coins, introduced with particular success along the Gam-
bia River but less so along the Senegal River. In the latter areas, silver coins were ac-
cepted only for their bullion value and often melted into jewelry.  
Where these zones overlapped, exchange rates between these various curren-
cies were often a great source of uncertainty for European merchants and colonial 
administrators. For the colonial government, the fixing of a sterling value of the five 
franc coin was part of an early effort to regulate the system in place for official trans-
actions of the colonial state (particularly the payment of taxes) and for British traders 
establishing themselves on the West African coast (Helleiner 2002). Such efforts in-
creased as colonial authority extended into the interior.  
A further motivation was the impact of changing global exchange rates and 
bullion prices on the currencies in circulation in West Africa, which created arbitrage 
opportunities for European and African merchants. In the 1870s, for example, shifts 
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in the gold-silver price ratio prompted an influx of silver dollars into the Gold Coast 
and Lagos. According to the colonial secretary in Lagos, the import of silver dollars 
was due to the ‘depreciation of silver in the European markets, which has enabled 
merchants to purchase them at prices sufficiently low to yield a profit in the colony 
after paying expenses’.3 Colonial officials complained that they had few uses for the 
coins locally and could not ship them back to Britain except at a loss. As a result, 
Spanish and American dollars were demonetized in all four British West African ter-
ritories in 1880.  
However, policies diverged with regard to French currency, which was de-
monetized in Nigeria and the Gold Coast but not Sierra Leone and the Gambia. In 
1880 the Treasury recommended that a different regimes be adopted for the latter two 
colonies owing to their extensive trade with French territory. A memorandum sent to 
the Colonial Office claimed that the Treasury have ‘long been anxious to substitute a 
sound currency system, based upon a single standard, either gold or silver, according 
to the habits and convenience of the people, in those colonies where a double stand-
ard’ had previously prevailed. They argued that while the Gold Coast was clearly 
suited to a gold standard, ‘the case of Sierra Leone and the Gambia appears to be 
more like that of Mauritius, where the double standard was replaced by a single silver 
standard, as best adapted to the wants of the country, whose trade is chiefly with the 
silver using countries’.4  
Though the Colonial Office disagreed with the Treasury’s assessment, there 
remained arguments for a separate policy in the Gambia and Sierra Leone. In 1900, 
the report of the Barbour Committee noted that  
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the circumstances of the Gambia and Sierra Leone are peculiar. A large 
amount of the money spent in these colonies is earned in the interior in French 
territory, where payments are made only in five-franc pieces. These coins are 
carried by native traders into the Gambia and Sierra Leone in order to pur-
chase imported articles, and it has been urged that the demonetization of the 
five-franc piece would deter natives from coming down to these British colo-
nies for this purpose. 
Such arguments convinced the British government that, for the time being, the five-
franc coin should remain legal tender in Sierra Leone and the Gambia even though it 
had been demonetized in the rest of British West Africa.  
Efforts to standardize the currency of British colonies in the region went a step 
further in 1912 with the establishment of the West African Currency Board (WACB). 
The Board introduced a new currency, the West African pound, in the four West Afri-
can colonies the following year. It was issued at fixed parity in exchange for sterling, 
and backed by sterling reserves (Hopkins 1970). The establishment of a separate cur-
rency for British West Africa had been under discussion since the late nineteenth cen-
tury owing to the rapid increase in the circulation of British silver shilling coins. The 
silver shilling, like the five-franc coin, was a silver coin which acted as a token coin 
under Britain’s gold standard system. It was not backed by gold but rather its value 
was managed through the balancing of supply and demand in Britain. As the numbers 
of such coins shipped to West Africa increased (see fig. 1), there were concerns in 
London that a crisis in West Africa could prompt the shipment home of large numbers 
of these coins, destabilizing their value in Britain.  
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Fig. 1 Imports of token silver shilling coins into British West Africa 
Source: West Africa Currency Commission (1912) 
 
The replacement of the silver shilling with the WACB currency (first coinage and 
then paper money), along with the managed shipment of silver shillings back to Brit-
ain, addressed this problem. It also allowed West African territories to share the sei-
gniorage revenue from the issue of currency in the colonies (Hopkins 1970).  
At the same time, the number of silver coins in circulation in Senegal was also 
increasing. French colonial authorities reintroduced silver coins into Senegal in the 
late nineteenth century (Webb 1999). From the 1880s until just after the war, net Sen-
egalese imports of silver coins from France increased (see Fig 2). These were largely 
linked to the groundnut trade; French traders could purchase groundnuts at lower cost 
if they paid with five franc coins than with cloth currencies or other goods because 
they had to pay import duties on the latter (Masaki 2015).  
 
Fig. 2 Net Imports of silver coins from France to Senegal 
Source: Masaki (2015). Unfortunately, the trade statistics do not allow us to distin-
guish between 5-franc coins and other silver coins.  
 
How many of these coins crossed the border into British territory? This is dif-
ficult to say with certainty. However, anecdotal evidence points to considerable in-
flows which shaped the colonial monetary system in the Gambia as well as, to a more 
limited degree, Sierra Leone. In both, the five-franc coin continued to circulate as le-
gal tender. Its retention was a concession to local interests. Several of the witnesses 
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giving evidence to the 1912 commission of enquiry which preceded the creation of 
the WACB suggested that the Gambia should be left out of any scheme for the intro-
duction of a new currency for British West Africa because of its connection to French 
West Africa. Sir George Denton, the Governor of the Gambia argued that the Gambia 
should be left to make its own policy because the colony was ‘so intimately connected 
with French commerce that it is a very important thing to have a coin in circulation 
that will pass freely between the natives on both sides of the boundary’.5 Similar con-
ditions existed in Sierra Leone, although to a lesser extent. Freetown had previously 
served as a trading hub for Africans from French Guinea. However, the former acting 
governor of the colony, Major Matthew Nathan, testified before the Barbour Commit-
tee that the development of the port at Conakry had altered patterns of trade and fewer 
traders from Guinea passed through Sierra Leone.6 By 1912, the colonial secretary of 
Sierra Leone claimed in his statement to the West African Currency Commission that 
the average circulation of five-franc coins there was around £5,000 or £6,000.7  
In contrast to Freetown, African traders from a wide radius continued to come 
to Bathurst in the Gambia for the purchase of imported goods. Thomas Estwick 
Pierce, collector of customs in the Gambia, stated in his testimony to the Barbour 
Committee that traders ‘come from the southern Soudan, and from Bida in caravans 
that take three months, and bring in bags full of dollars that they have derived from 
the French, and spend it in Gambia’.8 In 1916, the colonial administration in its annu-
al report stated that the French give-franc piece ‘is very largely used in native trade 
because of the facility of exchange with the inhabitants of adjoining French territory. 
The report further estimated that ‘probably from 50 to 70 per cent of payments in 
trade with natives of the Protectorate is made in the five franc piece’ (Gambia 1917, 
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p. 6). Its local value of four shillings reflected a custom (which continued through the 
colonial period) to ‘reckon in terms of four-shilling units in the market places of the 
country. Such units are known as “dalasies” or “dirhems” in the two vernacular lan-
guages, Mandinka and Wolloff repectively’ (Gambia Currency Board 1967, p. 9).  
Figure 3 gives the value of five-franc coins in British pence according to three 
metrics from the beginning of the pre-war gold standard period around 1880 through 
1930. The first shows the flat rate fixed in the Gambia in 1843, up to 1922. The se-
cond gives the value according to the fluctuating international exchange rate which 
remained relatively stable until World War I, playing an important role in the expan-
sion of trade in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Mitchener and Wei-
denmier 2008). In the third, the market price of silver per gram is used to calculate the 
market value of the silver bullion from which the coin was made. The periods in 
which the lines diverged provided potential opportunities for arbitrage.  
Under the pre-war gold standard, the international exchange rate between the 
pound and the franc remained stable at a rate very close to the fixed rate set in the 
Gambia. During this period, the bullion value of the coins was lower than their nomi-
nal value. Minor opportunities for arbitrage still existed: in 1899, Pierce testified the 
colonial administration in the Gambia made a small annual profit on shipping five-
franc coins back to Britain where their value was slightly higher than in the Gambia.9 
With the outbreak World War I, however, the gold standard was abandoned in 
favour of a paper standard owing to the financial demands of the war effort (Eichen-
green 1996, pp. 46-7). At that point, the international exchange rate began to deviate 
from its pre-war level. Depreciation of the franc against the pound meant the pence 
value of the five-franc coin fell to 43 pence. After a short return to close to its pre-war 
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value in 1918, it fell again to 20 pence in 1920 when the French government was un-
able to follow Britain back onto the gold standard (Bordo and Hautcoeur 2007). 
 
Fig. 3 Values of five-franc coin in British pence, 1880-1930 
 
Source: Global Financial Data; Gambia (1922); P. Lindert, ‘Silver in Britain’, on 
gpih.ucdavis.edu.  
 
  
 When the pre-war stability in the pound-franc exchange rate started to crum-
ble, it prompted difficulties in the Gambia and Sierra Leone. As early as 1915, Leslie 
Couper, director of the Bank of British West Africa, wrote to the Colonial Office 
about the position of the five-franc coin in the two territories. ‘In each of these colo-
nies the legal tender rate of the 5-franc piece is 3/10½, although the actual sterling 
value of the coin, based on the present London-Paris exchange rate, is now 3/5½d. 
This condition of affairs is obviously unsatisfactory and opens the door to losses to 
the governments of these colonies’.10 The risk of loss was partly due to the possibility 
that people in the colonies could profit from the difference in exchange rates. In July 
1916 a Colonial Office official noted in relation to Sierra Leone that ‘owing to the 
recent course of exchange it actually pays to import the pieces; get a draft on London 
(directly or indirectly) from the Bank for these pieces at the 3/10 rate (the actual rate 
varying lately from 3/5½ to 3/6½); with the proceeds import French pieces; thus ad 
infinitum’. 11  As exchange rates continued to shift during the year, the colonial gov-
ernment in Sierra Leone corresponded with the Colonial Office about the appropriate 
course of action. Options proposed including revising the official rate, banning im-
ports of the coin, and demonetizing the coin. In the end, the import of five-franc coins 
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was banned in October of that year.12 Within this discussion, the subject of the Gam-
bia was deliberately sidelined because, as one official from the Colonial Office put it, 
‘conditions are so different in Sierra Leone and the Gambia’ that different policies 
might be called for in the respective territories.13 However, the debates of 1916 fore-
shadowed bigger problems to come, in which the Gambia couldn’t be ignored.  
 After the war ended, it was not long before the effects of the disparity between 
the official and market exchange rates began to be observed throughout the territory. 
The Provincial Annual Reports from the Gambia for 1920 noted with some alarm 
both the disappearance of WACB coins and notes from circulation as well as an in-
crease of five-franc coins. Captain Leese of the Kombo and Foni Province observed 
in his report that ‘practically the only coin to be seen is the five-franc piece of France 
and other nations’ and suggested that this influx was due to trading firms and individ-
uals profiting from the difference in exchange rates. ‘Natives from bordering coun-
tries brought in a certain amount which they exchanged; with the five franc piece val-
ued at four shillings in the Protectorate the temptation to secure six or seven for a 
pound note or twenty shillings in British coinage was too great to be resisted’. Com-
missioners in other provinces made similar observations.14  These activities did not 
escape the notice of the Colonial Office a – minute of November 1921 noted that ‘the 
withdrawal of alloy coin shows that someone is alive to the profit of taking alloy 
coins to Senegal, changing them for 5/- francs and smuggling the five-franc pieces 
back to Bathurst for exchange into alloy coins again’.15 It was also reported that ‘mer-
chants are purchasing money orders for remittances to Freetown on so considerable a 
scale as to involve this government in heavy loss… Money orders for £12,000, practi-
cally the whole of which have been paid in five franc pieces, have been issued during 
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the last three and a half months as against a total of £7418 for the whole of last year’. 
This meant that the colonial administration in the Gambia would have to liquidate de-
posits in England to reimburse the Sierra Leone government.16 
 The coin was finally demonetized by a proclamation of 6 January 1922, an-
nounced in the Gazette on 15 January. The Gazette announced that the coins, ‘com-
monly known in the Colony and the Protectorate as “Dollars” will, up to and includ-
ing the 31st January, 1922, be exchanged by the Government for the sterling equiva-
lent of 3s 10½d each’. A special office of the Treasury was opened at the old Tide 
Surveyor’s office in Bathurst. Exchange depots were also opened at 17 stations spread 
through the interior provinces. Finally, the colonial accountant was authorized to is-
sue drafts on the Treasury at Bathurst in exchange for coins handed to him on the 
government yacht, the Mansa Kila Ba, as he travelled up and down the Gambia River.  
Over the following weeks, £407,950 in British West African currency was paid out in 
return for more than two million five-franc coins handed in to the various offices 
(Gambia 1923, p. 3).  
The demonetization of the five-franc coin was extremely costly for the coloni-
al government. The only value it could realize from five-franc pieces in its posses-
sion, whether already in government accounts or acquired during January, was either 
by exchanging them for British currency at the international rate of 1s 11d or by ship-
ping them to London to be melted down as bullion.  They chose the latter strategy as 
at that point the bullion value was higher than the nominal value (see fig. 3). To do 
this the colonial government borrowed £187,893 7s 11d from the West African Cur-
rency Board to cover the loss. The loan was issued at 4 per cent interest and repaid 
over the next decade, with a total expenditure of nearly £230,000. In addition to this 
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were the costs of the demonetization exercise itself, which amounted to £7237 1s 3d 
in 1922. To put these costs in perspective, they should be compared with total annual 
public revenue in this period of just over £200,000. Following the demonetization 
came a ‘complete recasting of the estimates’, in which planned infrastructure invest-
ments were ‘abandoned temporarily’. This included the provision of electric light in 
Bathurst and improvements to the government wharf.17  Repayments of the loan ab-
sorbed nearly ten per cent of expenditure over the next decade.18 The opportunity cost 
was particularly painful in the 1920s, when colonial development works still depend-
ed largely on local funds. In other colonies, the late 1920s saw considerable im-
provements in infrastructure and administration (Gardner 2012, pp. 130-33). In the 
Gambia, such progress was slow. In short, the demonetization dealt a severe blow to 
the Gambia’s financial position. How and why did this crisis emerge? The next two 
sections position the origins of the currency crisis in the context of colonial expansion 
and the financial structure of the British Empire.  
 
III 
The immediate political context for the 1843 order-in-council which established the 
3s 10½d rate was the creation of a separate administration for the coastal colony of 
the Gambia, which previously had been ruled from Freetown, Sierra Leone. This sec-
tion will examine the creation and administration of the Gambia, illustrating a central 
irony of colonial rule in the region, one consequence of which was the ‘curious inci-
dent’: maintaining nominal political authority over territory within particular bounda-
ries often required implicitly supporting smuggling and migration from beyond them. 
Colonial Gambia, in other words, came to follow the same policies of post-
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independence ‘warehouse states’, which have adopted official economic strategies 
‘based on liberal import regimes and the transiting of good to their more protectonist 
neighbours’ (Meagher 2003, p. 59). 
 Barry (1998, p. 221) dates the colonial partition of Senegambia to 1889, when 
the Anglo-French convention on the boundaries between French and British territories 
was signed. The agreement established British hegemony over a 10 kilometer-wide 
band on either side of the Gambia River from the coast to Yarbatendu. The French 
also agreed to limit their activities within 170 km of the Gambia River. This agree-
ment came at the end of a long span of European competition for access to lucrative 
Senegambian trading networks. Proximity to Europe meant that it was one of the first 
parts of the region to engage in direct trade with Europeans and became the focus of 
early European competition for access to trade with West Africa. Initially, this com-
petition focused on fortified coastal outposts established during the slave trade era. 
Such outposts, like the one on St Mary’s Island which became Bathurst in the Gam-
bia, were later repurposed to serve the needs of the abolition movement.   
The rise of cash crop production during this period provided an economic mo-
tive for further intervention in the interior (Klein 1972, pp. 424). The gum trade had 
initially brought French trading interest into the region (Webb 1985). By the middle 
of the nineteenth century, however, the gum trade had been eclipsed by groundnut 
exports, production of which had accelerated rapidly following their first cultivation 
in the 1830s (see Fig. 4). Like palm oil, groundnut oil was increasingly in demand in 
Europe, where industrialization increased the demand for oils and fats to be used as 
industrial lubricants and in consumer goods like soap (Bowman 1987, p. 89; Brooks 
1975, p. 29). Until World War I, Senegambian groundnuts, including those shipped 
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from British ports, were exported primarily to France and French firms were domi-
nant in the trade (Bowman 1997, p. 127).  
 
Fig. 4 Groundnut exports from the Gambia 
Source: Brooks (1975, p. 4).   
 
 In the process of partition, the European powers needed to deal not only with 
one another but also with indigenous states which were themselves in a long period of 
intense economic and political upheaval. Klein (1972: 419) describes the religious 
wars which engulfed the region from the seventeenth through the late nineteenth cen-
turies as linked to four key factors in the region’s history: 1) abolition of the slave 
trade and the weakening of institutions which depended on it; 2) the rise of the export 
trades in gum and peanuts which created new economic interests among producers; 3) 
the region’s integration into European spheres of influence, and; 4) long-standing ten-
sions within Senegambian societies.  Intervention in these conflicts, particularly by 
the French, made conquest, as Klein puts it ‘inevitable’ because it placed African 
states in direct opposition to European forces with an increasing advantage in coer-
cive power.  
 That the Gambia would remain British was not necessarily inevitable during 
the final decades of the nineteenth century. The French were dominant in northern 
Senegambia, and at several points negotiations for an exchange of territory between 
Britain and France, in which the French would acquire the Gambia while Britain 
would receive territory along the Ivory Coast (Barry 1998). However, negotiations 
were undermined by wider uncertainties about the future of French colonial tariff pol-
icies. Just as the exchange of territory was being negotiated, pressure was growing in 
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France for increasingly protectionist tariff policy, and the colonial tariffs of Senegal 
were under review. Alive to the possibility of differential tariffs, the British govern-
ment insisted on a high price in terms of territory in exchange for the Gambia, and 
negotiations ultimately collapsed (Newbury 1971, pp. 228-30). Barry (1998: 220) also 
argues that trade policy, along with wider British ambitions in the Niger Bend, played 
an important role in defeating any proposed exchange, noting that ‘certain French 
traders with major interests in the Gambia sabotaged the exchange agreement because 
they wanted to continue profiting from customs and tax breaks given to them by the 
British colony’.  
The importance of proposed French tariff increases in shaping the negotiations 
for territorial exchange suggests, according to Newbury, that ‘fear of exclusion from 
regional markets as a motive for territorial expansion’ should not be dismissed (New-
bury 1971, p. 254). In this case what the British government retained was not just ac-
cess to the narrow band of riverbank, but to the wider Senegambian commercial net-
work. The long land border around the Gambia was (and remains) costly to enforce, 
and from the beginning the Gambian colonial administration depended for its fiscal 
solvency on the illicit movement of goods and people across it.  
 As in other West African colonies, state revenue in the Gambia came primari-
ly from trade taxes (see figure 5). An export tax on groundnuts, introduced in 1863, 
became, along with import tariffs, the most important revenue source in the colony.  
 
Fig. 5 Sources of Revenue in the Gambia, 1870-1913 (1913 £) 
Source: Gambia (1870-1914), deflated using (Feinstein 1976, Table 61).  
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These sources of revenue relied on the loose enforcement of border controls, for two 
reasons. The first was that groundnut production relied on migrant labour. Across 
sub-Saharan Africa, labour shortages were an important obstacle to increasing export 
production (Austin 2008, pp. 597-8). In the Gambia, the demand for labour during the 
groundnut planting and harvest season was filled by migrant labourers known as 
‘strange farmers’. According to the colony’s annual report from 1919, strange farmers 
‘came from east, north, and south – sometimes long distances – from French and Por-
tuguese territory’. In exchange for clearing and planting a plot of land, they received 
food, housing and a portion of the proceeds from the sale of the groundnuts (Gambia 
1920, p. 8). Strange farmers had been part of the Gambian groundnut trade since its 
beginnings in the early nineteenth century, following an older tradition of migrants 
working temporarily for trading caravans in order to earn funds for bride wealth or 
consumer goods (Swindell 1980, p. 93). The number of strange farmers coming into 
the Gambia during the colonial period was considerable. Gamble (1949, p. 73) ob-
served that ‘over the past 34 years, their number in the Protectorate has averaged 
about 14,000 per year, varying from 2,500 in 1942 to 32,000 in 1915. As the local 
adult male population is round about 77,000 the strangers make up quite a high pro-
portion of the farming population’.  
 Strange farmers contributed to the revenue primarily through the production of 
groundnuts exported from the territory, on which tax was levied. Gamble (1949, pp. 
74-5), argues that ‘there are other factors which affect the total exports …, but the 
number of strange farmers is clearly the dominant factor’. They also contributed 
through the purchase of imported goods which were taxed, though at lower rates than 
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in French territory. These they would take back across the border with them, general-
ly avoiding the notice of French customs officials.  
Smuggling occurred in both directions and it was another source of groundnut 
exports. Most of the research on smuggling between Senegal and the Gambia has fo-
cused on the post-independence period, when it has been a major source of tension 
between the two countries. In 1975, a World Bank report noted that the cross-border 
trade from Senegal to the Gambia ‘appears to consist mostly of groundnuts produced 
in Senegal’. It estimated that around 20,000 tons of groundnuts exports from the 
Gambia had originally come from Senegal (World Bank 1975, p. 6). 
Several important constituencies gained from this trade. One was comprised 
of traders – from both The Gambia and Senegal – who could earn substantial incomes 
through re-exports to Senegal. A second was the Gambian state, which collected rev-
enue tariffs on both goods smuggled into Senegal, and Senegalese groundnuts export-
ed from the Gambia. Conversely, the Senegalese government suffered severe losses to 
its customs revenue from the smuggling of consumer goods from the Gambia – 
Boone (1994, p. 464) estimates the loss to the Senegalese government as 405 billion 
CFA francs in 1969, and probably triple that in the 1970s. One reason for such large-
scale smuggling was differences in trade policies which raised the price of consumer 
goods in Senegal.  
However, there is considerable evidence to suggest that smuggling was rife 
during the colonial period as well. Reginald Jarrett (1949, p. 650), a former colonial 
official, noted in the 1940s that ‘it has generally been assumed that the export from 
the Gambia has been produced one-third by native farmers, one-third by strange 
farmers, and one-third in adjacent French territory’. Migrants bringing groundnuts 
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over the border would also use the proceeds from their sales to purchase imported 
goods in the Gambia. Imports into the British colony were often cheaper than the 
same goods in Senegal, particularly as the French colonial tariff regime became more 
protectionist in the inter-war period (Boone 1992, p. 32). In a study of contemporary 
smuggling between Senegal and the Gambia, Golub and Mbaye (2009, p. 598) note 
that ‘by the 1920s, The Gambia was a regional hub for trade in foodstuffs, textiles and 
footwear’. 
Cross-border trade was widespread and well known to colonial officials on 
both sides of the boundary. French authorities made effort to curb groundnut smug-
gling, allocating a million francs in the 1925 budget for the construction of a railway 
through Casamance in order to ‘avoid the export of groundnuts from this region 
through English Gambia’.19 Groundnuts were also Senegal’s most important export, 
and smuggling represented a major loss to the French treasury.20 This loss was suffi-
cient that, at the height of the Great Depression in 1935, when government spending 
was being cut, the French colonial government increased its expenditure on customs 
and border enforcement. New posts were created along the Gambia-Senegal border to 
allow for the ‘closer repression of fraud’ in the area.21    
 The strategy adopted by the Gambian colonial administration was not very 
different from historical patterns of rule by African states – both colonial and pre-
colonial. By focusing on the control of access to international trade through Bathurst, 
it fit the ‘gatekeeper state’ model described by Cooper (2002, pp. 156-61). Brecken-
ridge (2014, pp. 5-6) notes that studies of the colonial state ‘show that typically the 
state in Africa was built to control trade – it began at the harbor, expanded to form the 
colonial city, followed the line of rail and relied heavily on revenues from the export 
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of a single commodity’. The difference here is that the Gambia made efforts to cap-
ture the trade of neighbouring territories as well through the adoption of more open 
trade policy. In this it echoed similar efforts by pre-colonial states to attract traders 
away from rival states (see, e.g., Lovejoy and Richardson 2004). 
 
IV 
The Gambia’s financial structure, outlined in the previous section, provides the key to 
understanding why the demonetization of the five-franc coin was delayed for several 
years despite the rising costs of maintaining the pre-war exchange rate. This section 
will offer several complementary explanations for the delay, which link to broader 
issues in the financial and monetary organization of the British Empire as a whole. 
First, the Gambian monetary crisis illustrates the decentralized nature of power in the 
British imperial system. The Colonial Office in London had pressed for demonetiza-
tion since the war years, but local administrations were allowed to delay. Second, it 
illustrated the potential for conflicts in particular local circumstances between two of 
the key pillars of colonial financial policy: fiscal balance and currency convertibility. 
The Gambian administration delayed demonetizing the franc largely because they be-
lieved it threatened the colony’s most important sources of revenue. Third, it reflects 
the often limited knowledge about African economies which informed colonial poli-
cies. In this case, misapprehensions about the ways in ways in which African markets 
connected to international markets occasionally steered colonial officials away from 
earlier demonetization.  
 Some accounts of the demonetization have laid the blame for the crisis at the 
feet of the imperial government. For example, Gailey (1964, pp. 167-8) writes that 
		
23 
‘the decision to continue the five-franc piece in circulation long after other countries 
had followed the prevailing world rate was not one that the Gambia government, let 
alone the Gambian people, could make. This was a decision which had been made by 
Treasury officials of Great Britain’. As a result, he describes the demonetization as 
‘the most glaring example of the indifferent financial attitude of the British govern-
ment concerning the needs of the Gambia’.  
The suggestion that the Gambian administration was ordered to continue using 
the fixed rate is not well supported by the archival evidence. In fact, the crisis pro-
vides a good illustration of the dangers of decentralized rule in the British Empire. 
From 1916, the Colonial Office was in favour of demonetization, with the Colonial 
Secretary stating with regard to Sierra Leone in 1916 that ‘there is really no reason 
why a foreign silver coin should have legal tender status’.22 While there was some 
anxiety during the war about whether demonetization would ‘offend our allies’, it was 
pointed out that the French levied a duty of 25 per cent on imports of British token 
silver coins.23 For their part, the Treasury were in favour of prohibiting imports of the 
coin and demonetizing so long as the latter did not require large-scale minting of sil-
ver coin to replace the five-franc coin during the war.24   
In contrast, the colonial administration ‘protested energetically’ against pro-
posals for demonetization.25 The colonial administration of the Gambia responded to 
Colonial Office queries on the subject with reassurances that the fixed rate was not 
causing problems and that any attempt to demonetize the coin would damage trade. 
The Governor wrote to the Secretary of State in June 1916 stating that ‘no difficulty 
appears to have arisen up to the time of writing, as far at any rate as the government is 
concerned’ and that ‘if the legal tender status of the five-franc piece were to be done 
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away with, its trade value would presumably begin and continue to fluctuate, and I 
can conceive a great deal of trouble resulting in the Protectorate, unless a fixed substi-
tute were provided in its place’.26 The Governor was basing his recommendation on a 
report by the Receiver General a month earlier, which argued that ‘it would be inad-
visable to alter the local value and would create distrust and dissatisfaction amongst 
the inhabitants of the Protectorate and might act detrimentally on the groundnut 
trade’.27 
 In the end, the Colonial Office did not compel either Sierra Leone or the 
Gambia to demonetize the coin during the war.  It was decided in the case of Sierra 
Leone, with the agreement of the Governor, that imports of five-franc pieces should 
be prohibited, and that in both Sierra Leone and the Gambia ‘the question of demone-
tizing them could then be considered after the war when the franc has recovered its 
value’.28 Colonial Office staff were not alone in believing that there would be return 
to pre-war rates after the war was over; rather, this was a generally held view across 
the British establishment. The Interim Report of the Cunliffe Committee, published in 
1918, stressed the importance of a return to gold at pre-war parities as soon as the war 
ended and found ‘there was no difference of opinion among the witnesses who ap-
peared before us as to the vital importance’ of restoring the pre-war system.29 France 
and Italy had similar aims (Eichengreen and Temin 2000, p. 190).  
 The post-war trade boom did nothing initially to dampen these hopes. After 
the more dramatic depreciation of the franc began in 1918, increasing commodity 
prices to some degree masked its local impact. As Flood wrote in a later minute on 
the crisis, ‘In 1919 and 1920 trade was booming and the difficulty was to keep 
enough coin in circulation to finance operation’. Rising silver prices meant that ‘a 
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five-franc piece became worth about 5/- as bullion’.30  Figure 2 shows that if the five-
franc coin had been demonetized in 1920, the cost would have been minimal because 
of the high value of silver bullion. However, many observers both in Britain and in 
the colonies interpreted the boom in 1919/20 as a signal that pre-war conditions were 
likely to resume. In Britain, high levels of demand for the products of industries like 
the cotton industry led to extensive recapitalization in anticipation of continued 
growth (Broadberry 1997, p. 250). In response, both producers and colonial adminis-
trators planned investments in expanding export production (Gardner 2012, pp. 60-
71). 
When the boom collapsed, coins returned to banks and pressure to demonetize 
resumed. The Gambia again protested that to do so would disrupt trade. At a meeting 
in Downing Street on the 23rd of November, 1921, to which several colonial officials 
on leave from the Gambia were invited, one of them, B. A. Finn, argued that the im-
mediate demonetization of the five-franc coin ‘might lead to the natives refusing to 
grow any nuts’.31 In reference to pressure from the Gambian governor to delay the 
demonetization, a minute by J. Flood of the Colonial Office noted, ‘we didn’t like it 
but he was so anxious that we gave in’.32 
 This would come as no surprise to students of the imperial monetary system 
over the long run. From the beginning of imperial expansion, the metropolitan gov-
ernment had struggled to enforce a consistent monetary policy in distant territories. 
Local economic interests which differed from those of the imperial government had 
often motivated colonial governments to steer their own course in setting exchange 
rates with foreign currencies. Increasing transaction costs driven by local exchange 
rate differences prompted complaints to the British government, which made occa-
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sional attempts to impose a single standard across the empire. In his comprehensive 
history of British imperial monetary policy, Chalmers (1893, pp. 3-37) notes that the 
period up to 1704 was characterized in part by the competitive overvaluation of Span-
ish dollars by individual colonies attempting to attract the coins. Legislation passed in 
1705 to stop this practice was largely ignored. An attempt in 1825 to make the new 
token silver shilling the circulating medium of the British Empire also failed owing to 
differences in the local needs of far-flung colonies. The solution found during the 
nineteenth century was the creation of currency areas in which the need for converti-
bility with sterling was balanced against local particularities. In his survey of devel-
opments since Chalmers, Clauson (1944) divides the empire into four groups: the 
sterling group, the rupee group, the ex-silver group and the U.S. Dollar group. Each 
of these also contained several sub-groups. 
 With the establishment of the WACB, British West Africa had become part of 
Clauson’s sterling group. However, the continued legal tender status of the five-franc 
coin suggests that local interests could still press successfully for exceptions to impe-
rial rules.  Chalmers (1893, p. 29) noted that even proponents of a single imperial cur-
rency were aware of the need for local differences: ‘it is true that certain foreign coins 
were allowed also to be legally current, such as the dollar and the doubloon; but it 
was only by way of compromise that these non-sterling coins were allowed to circu-
late concurrently with sterling’.  
 Such compromises were in part linked to the potential for conflict between the 
desire for convertibility and the reduction of transaction costs, on the one hand, and 
the pressure for colonial administrations to be financially self-sufficient, on the other. 
The principle of financial self-sufficiency for individual colonial administrations was 
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a response to British taxpayers who were increasingly unwilling to devote British re-
sources to the development of distant colonies. Colonies which asked for financial aid 
from Britain were subsequently forced to submit budgets for auditing, losing much of 
their local autonomy (Gardner 2012, pp. 3-26). A key reason for the Gambian admin-
istration’s resistance to proposals for demonetization was the belief that demonetizing 
would hinder the import and export trades which generated the bulk of the colony’s 
tax revenue. It estimated, in other words, that the cost in terms of decreased ground-
nut production and more limited trade with Senegal would be larger than the cost of 
the demonetization. 
 This miscalculation of the relative cost of the demonetization was based partly 
on incorrect understandings by colonial officials about African demand for particular 
currencies and the patterns of their circulation. It was assumptions about the African 
preference for five-franc coins in the groundnut trade that drove fears that demonetiz-
ing would hinder export production and cross-border trade. It also motivated plans for 
the timing of the demonetization. Governor Armitage initially believed that the cost 
of the demonetization could be reduced by demonetizing at the during the harvest 
season, ‘by waiting till the coins got well into circulation again and hoping they 
would get back into French territory’. The Gambia was perhaps unfortunate in that the 
leadership of the colony changed in the midst of the crisis. Governor Armitage, for-
merly Chief Commissioner of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast, was newly 
arrived in October 1920. Armitage had no previous experience in the Gambia and his 
proposals for resolving the crisis often put him at odds with district officers of longer 
local experience, who argued that strange farmers were more likely to exchange the 
cash they were paid for groundnuts for consumer goods in the Gambia before return-
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ing to Senegal (Swindell and Jeng 2001, 191). After the Gambian government had 
finally agreed to the demonetization, Flood of the Colonial Office wrote ‘apparently 
the Gambia have now woke up to the fact that coins will trickle in from all quarters 
and the local people suggest demonetization now, and that Govt should take over all 
the coins. This is rather what we think but we have been swayed by the argument that 
the natives want “dollars”.33 
 In the end, the 1922 demonetization succeeded in eliminating the exchange 
rate disparity but not the local circulation of French currency in the Gambia. The Pro-
vincial Commissioners report from the Upper River province from 1922 noted that ‘it 
is still very necessary for the firms to have French paper money to buy groundnuts 
with. The Senegal natives ask before selling their nuts if they can be paid in French 
money, if not, they pass on to a firm that can. A lot of goods are bought with French 
paper by the natives coming over from Senegal’.34 In the late 1960s, it was reported to 
the Bank of England that ‘CFA francs, of course, are not legal tender in the Gambia. 
Nevertheless, they circulate freely more or less throughout the country’.35  As in ear-
lier periods, officials allowed French currency to circulate, as Chalmers put it, ‘by 
way of compromise’.  
 
V 
The inter-war period in general, and the 1920s in particular, has long been a fruitful 
period for the study of monetary history owing to the instability of exchange rates 
during the interregnum between the classical gold standard of the pre-war period and 
the fragile gold-exchange standard adopted in the second half of the decade. Eichen-
green (1990, pp. 1-2) argues that the ‘interwar period provides an exceptionally rich 
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menu of international monetary experience’. Turmoil in the international monetary 
system began with the abandonment of the gold standard during World War I and was 
followed by, as Eichengreen describes it, ‘a period of floating exchange rates the like 
of which the industrial economies have experienced neither before or since. Between 
1921 and 1925 the major currencies floated against one another in the virtual absence 
of central bank intervention.’  
 Often forgotten in the study of such movements are their impacts on the de-
pendent colonies of the European powers. The Gambia was not the only place where 
floating exchange rates caused difficulties in the years following World War I. Where 
there were differences between the currency in circulation and the currency in which 
major international obligations were denominated, fluctuating exchange rates created 
uncertainty.  In independent Liberia, for example, British and WACB currency had 
formed the primary medium of exchange and store of value since the nineteenth cen-
tury, following the depreciation of the unbacked Liberian dollar. The Liberian gov-
ernment had begun collecting taxes and other payments in sterling from the late nine-
teenth century to service its sterling-denominated debts. From 1912, however, Libe-
ria’s sovereign debt was denominated in dollars, though taxes were still collected in 
sterling. When sterling depreciated against the dollar in the 1930s, it became increas-
ingly difficult for the Liberian government to service its debts (Gardner 2014, p. 
1105). In East Africa, early trade links with India had initially placed the region in the 
rupee group, but when the rupee appreciated against the pound it created difficulties 
for settlers trying to service rupee-denominated debts with earnings in pounds. A new 
currency, the East African shilling, was introduced in 1921, moving East Africa into 
the sterling group (Maxon 1989). Studying these episodes yields, as Eichengreen de-
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scribed for Europe, ‘an exceptionally rich menu’ of monetary experience in African 
countries. And yet this period has not featured widely in research on African mone-
tary systems, which has focused instead on the introduction of new currencies at the 
beginning of colonial rule or after independence (Guyer 1995; Hopkins 1970; Ofona-
goro 1979; Saul 2004; Schenk 1997; Uche 1996, 1997). 
 This paper set out to answer three questions about the ‘curious incident’ of the 
franc in the Gambia. First, why did the Gambia retain as legal tender a foreign coin 
even after efforts to standardize the colonial monetary systems of British and French 
Africa? The answer can be found in the Gambia’s role as an early ‘warehouse state’ 
as well as the views of colonial administrators about African economic behavior. The 
Gambia depended on illicit movements of goods and produce across the long land 
border with French Senegal. Colonial administrators believed that maintaining the 
five-franc coin at a fixed rate was crucial to these trades continuing. This also helps 
explain why the Gambia delayed demonetizing the coin, despite pressure from the 
Colonial Office. Delay was also linked to widespread beliefs in both Britain and the 
Gambia that there would be a return to the pre-war status quo.  
Before the war, stable exchange rates under the gold standard allowed local 
anomalies like the continued circulation of the five-franc coin to persist. It was only 
when these rates became unstable that such local idiosyncrasies came to the attention 
of the Colonial Office in London. As the WACB (1923, p. 3) observed with regard to 
the five-franc coin, ‘so long as the French exchange remained at or about 25 or 26 
francs to the pound sterling, no difficulty arose with regard to these coins, but the fall 
in the French exchange had the effect of giving them a local value which was consid-
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erably above their actual worth, and offered a dangerous inducement to import the 
coins’.  
The third question posed by the introduction asked how changes in the inter-
national monetary system influenced African economies. This cannot be answered by 
the study of a single event. However, the Gambian crisis does suggest a need for fur-
ther research on African monetary systems during the turbulent inter-war period and 
their connections to the international monetary regime. In their study of the impact of 
imperial monetary unions on trade, Mitchener and Weidenmeier (2008, 1828-9) argue 
that ‘future research will need to examine the institutional variation within and across 
colonies’ to understand the economic impact of colonial currency unions. A better 
understanding of crises like the ‘curious incident’ may help direct such future study.  
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Map 1 The Gambia in West Africa  
 
Source: Author using MagicMaps 
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Fig. 1 Imports of silver shilling coins into British West Africa 
 
Source: West Africa Currency Commission (1912) 
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Fig 2 Net imports of silver coins from France to Senegal 
 
Source: Masaki (2015)  
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Fig. 3 Values of five-franc coin in British pence, 1880-1930 
 
Source: Global Financial Data; Gambia, Annual Report 1922; P. Lindert, ‘Silver in 
Britain’, on gpih.ucdavis.edu.  
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Fig. 4 Groundnut exports from the Gambia 
 
Source: Brooks (1975, p. 4).   
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Fig. 5 Sources of Revenue in the Gambia, 1870-1913 (1913 £) 
 
Source: Gambia (1870-1914), deflated using (Feinstein 1976, Table 61).  
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